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Social Acceptance and Self-Esteem: Tuning the Sociometer to Interpersonal Value 
 
Abstract 
The author drew on sociometer theory to propose that self-esteem is attuned to traits that garner others’ 
acceptance, and the traits that garner acceptance depend on one’s social role. Attunement of self-esteem 
refers to the linkage, or connection, between self-esteem and specific traits, which may be observed most 
clearly in the association between self-esteem and specific self-evaluations. In most roles, appearance and 
popularity determine acceptance, so self-esteem is most attuned to those traits. At the same time, 
interdependent social roles emphasize the value of communal qualities, so occupants of those roles have 
self-esteem that is more attuned to communal qualities than is the general norm. To avoid the biases of 
people's personal theories, attunement of self-esteem to particular traits was assessed indirectly via the 
correlation between self-esteem and self-ratings (Study 2), with cognitive accessibility measures (Study 
3), by observing the responsiveness of people’s self-concepts to social cues about the self (Study 4), and 
with an experiment involving social decision-making (Study 5). As hypothesized, self-esteem was 
generally more attuned to appearances than communal qualities, but interdependent social roles predicted 
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“Let grace and goodness be the principal loadstone of thy affections.” 
John Dryden (1631 - 1700) 
"It is better to be beautiful than good, but it is better to be good than ugly." 
Oscar Wilde (1854 - 1900) 
 
Western society seems to be of two minds about the traits that it values. People state 
emphatically that it is “what’s inside” that counts and encourage their children not to judge others 
based on appearances, yet they revere attractive people to an astonishing degree. They say they value 
communal qualities such as kindness and understanding the most (e.g., Berscheid & Reis, 1998; Buss 
& Barnes, 1986), but seem to be exceptionally interested in achieving good looks and popularity. 
However, these apparently opposing value systems are not necessarily contradictory. I argue that 
although appearances are highly prized in Western society, there are important social roles that 
emphasize the interpersonal value of “what’s inside.” My social-role model of interpersonal value 
predicts that self-esteem is generally tied to appearances, but self-esteem will also be linked to 
communal qualities when one’s social role dictates that such qualities are important for garnering 
acceptance from others.  
The Social Nature of Self-Esteem 
 
Sociometer theory provides the framework for my predictions about the relation between 
self-esteem and socially valued traits (e.g., Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & 
Downs, 1995). Sociometer theory proposes that self-esteem is a barometer of one's past, present, and 
future perceived relational value. People high in self-esteem (HSEs) feel that they were, are, and will 
be valued by others, whereas people low in self-esteem (LSEs) doubt their value as relational 
partners, and project these doubts onto future relationships (see Leary et al., 1995; Murray, Holmes, 
& Collins, 2006).  
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In my view, sociometer theory has two primary implications for understanding the interface 
between one’s self-esteem and one’s social world. First, the theory maintains that self-esteem is 
responsive to one’s social experiences. Specific instances of acceptance or rejection cause acute 
changes in one’s state self-esteem (Leary et al., 1995), and over time, social experiences of 
acceptance or rejection cause one to have chronically high, or low, global self-esteem. To date, most 
research has examined this first implication of sociometer theory. But a second implication provides 
the framework for my theorizing in this dissertation: Chronic feelings of high or low self-esteem can 
influence one’s beliefs and social motivations. For example, LSEs believe that they are less valuable 
interaction partners than do HSEs (see Leary et al., 1995), LSEs have less confidence than HSEs that 
their romantic partner loves them and regards them positively (Murray et al., 2006), and LSEs 
anticipate less acceptance from novel interaction partners than HSEs (Anthony, Wood, & Holmes, 
2007). These beliefs may underlie differences between LSEs’ and HSEs’ social motivations--LSEs 
adopt a self-protective behavioral style, whereas HSEs adopt a more risky, self-enhancing style 
(Anthony et al., 2007; Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989).    
In my dissertation, I study the implications of chronic self-esteem for beliefs and social 
motivation by examining the manner in which self-esteem is linked to particular traits. I refer to the 
linkage, or connection, between self-esteem and specific traits as the attunement of self-esteem. The 
social nature of self-esteem means that self-esteem is attuned to traits that garner acceptance from 
others. Attunement of self-esteem has been observed in the association between self-esteem and 
specific self-evaluations (e.g., MacDonald, Saltzman, & Leary, 2003). For example, HSEs, who are 
confident that they are valued, believe they possess valued traits in abundance, whereas LSEs, who 
doubt their social worth, rate themselves lower on socially valued traits. I take this idea one step 
further to propose that because one’s social role influences the traits that garner acceptance from 
others, social roles will determine the attunement of self-esteem to specific traits.  
For example, consider the role of a varsity athlete. The best athletes possess speed, agility, 
and stamina. More importantly, such people are generally admired by their peers. This association 
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with actual acceptance leads athletes’ self-esteem to be attuned to such traits. In contrast, 
mathematical abilities are not predictive of acceptance for athletes, so athletes’ self-esteem is not 
attuned to mathematical abilities. Conversely, in the social role of engineering graduate student, 
mathematical skills do predict one’s relational value, whereas athletic abilities fade in importance. 
Hence, an engineering graduate student’s self-esteem is attuned to math skills, but is not attuned to 
athletic abilities. From my perspective, the athlete and the graduate student did not decide to have 
self-esteem that is dependent on speed or mathematical skills. Other people made this choice for them 
by accepting or rejecting occupants of those social roles who possessed, or lacked, speed and 
mathematical abilities, respectively. 
From this example, it is clear that I believe that my social-role model of the attunement of 
self-esteem is theoretically applicable to any social role. However, in this dissertation I focus 
specifically on examining the attunement of self-esteem in social roles than vary on the dimension of 
independence-interdependence, and rely on individual difference operationalizations of social roles to 
test my hypotheses. To foreshadow the arguments to come, I propose that easily observable, 
“superficial” traits like physical attractiveness, social skills, and popularity are the most socially 
valued traits in Western society. Hence, people will have self-esteem that is highly attuned to such 
traits. Yet I also propose that internal virtues like kindness, warmth, and honesty are highly valued in 
occupants of social roles within Western society that emphasize interdependence (e.g., people in close 
romantic relationships), and so occupants of interdependent roles will have self-esteem that is more 
attuned to such traits than is the general norm.      
The “Superficiality” of the Sociometer 
Evidence garnered over 30 years of Western social psychological research confirms the value 
of traits such as physical attractiveness, popularity, and social skills. Following Rubin (1973), I term 
such easily observable and relatively unambiguous traits Social Commodities (SCs). Rubin (1973) 
and Walster, Berschied, and Walster (1973) used the language of economics to describe the process 
of relationship formation, contending that SCs are the most valuable traits on the “interpersonal 
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marketplace.” They suggested that people first assess their own net social worth in terms of SCs, and 
then try to initiate a merger with someone of equal worth. People are even assumed to understand, at 
least implicitly, that their level of SCs heavily influences acceptance by others.  
Although our society tends to use the term "superficial" pejoratively, valuing traits that are 
easy to assess may actually be adaptive. For example, it makes sense to judge people based upon 
traits that one can assess accurately in a short period of time, because it guarantees at least some value 
in a new interaction partner. Additionally, evolutionary models have long argued that SCs are 
inherently valuable because of their influence on one's ability to successfully bear or support 
offspring. For example, physical attractiveness may be a marker of genetic fitness and resistance to 
disease, making people valuable mates, whereas social status affords social and material benefits to 
one's mates and interaction partners (e.g., Buss & Barnes, 1986; Thornhill & Grammar, 1999). 
Because of their value to others, it is a harsh reality that good-looking people are well liked and well 
treated, which could explain why they have better social skills and social confidence (e.g., Reis, 
Wheeler, Spiegel, Kernis, Nezlek, & Perri, 1982). Consequently, based on my sociometer 
perspective, I predict that self-esteem is most attuned to SCs because SCs determine one’s social 
value and the likelihood of acceptance by others.  
Communal Qualities and the Sociometer 
When people say, “It’s what’s inside that counts,” they refer to traits like kindness, warmth, 
responsiveness, and honesty. I term these less observable traits Communal Qualities (CQs). 
Participants in my studies believe that although SCs take only “an hour” to assess, CQs take “a few 
days," (Anthony, Wood, Logel, Parker, & Holmes, 2007). Although Western society generally 
emphasizes the possession of the easy-to-assess SCs, particular social roles within Western society 
increase the importance of the less-observable CQs relative to the general norm.  
Social roles are positions that one can hold either within a larger social structure, or within a 
particular relationship (Stets & Burke, 2003). Although one’s personal identification with a particular 
role may vary, I suspect that other people do not hold such a nuanced view. For example, although 
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individuals vary in the extent to which they personally identify with being a woman, to other people, 
one simply is, or is not, a woman. Hence, other people will expect and desire occupants of a given 
social role to possess the traits that allow occupants of that role to successfully fulfill role 
requirements (e.g., Eagly & Wood, 1999). Because self-esteem is attuned to the question, “What traits 
will make me a valuable relational partner?,” the extent to which self-esteem is attuned to traits 
depends on the norms and expectancies for the social roles that people occupy. In this dissertation, I 
test this hypothesis by examining variation in the attunement of self-esteem across roles that differ in 
interdependence. Interdependent social roles emphasize the goal of satisfying another person and 
maintaining harmonious relationships (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Markus & Kitiyama, 1991), and so 
the possession of CQs is essential for fulfilling important role expectancies. I focus on three such 
roles--being a woman, having a primarily East Asian cultural identity, and being a romantic partner.   
Cross and Madson (1997) contend that the female gender role fundamentally involves the 
adoption of a relational self-construal, wherein one’s primary motivation is to maintain harmonious 
relationships. Eagly and Wood’s Social Role Theory (Eagly & Wood, 1999; Wood & Eagly, 2002) 
also suggests that girls are encouraged to develop other-oriented, communal traits and that grown 
women who possess such traits are highly valued. Hence, I predict that women's self-esteem is more 
attuned to their CQ self-beliefs than is men's.  
People raised in Asian cultures also tend to have more interdependent self-construals than 
Westerners (Markus & Kitiyama, 1991; Oyserman, 2004; Triandis, 2001). I expect that North 
Americans of East Asian descent have self-esteem that is attuned more strongly to CQs than do other 
North Americans. 
Finally, Interdependence Theory (Kelley, 1979) suggests that one adopts an increasingly 
interdependent orientation when in a satisfying romantic relationship. Thus, relative to single people, 
the addition of the “relationship partner” social role for people in romantic relationships should 
increase the attunement of self-esteem to CQs. 
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Although I predict that these interdependent social roles moderate the association between 
self-esteem and CQ self-views, I predict that none of these roles decrease the attunement of self-
esteem to SCs. The broader social context of Western culture strongly emphasizes the possession of 
SCs, an emphasis that is not diminished by being female, being of East Asian descent, or being in a 
romantic relationship.  
Contrasting This Model with Self-Esteem Contingency Theory 
My model overlaps in theme with self-esteem contingency theory (e.g., Crocker & Wolfe, 
2001). Contingencies of self-worth reflect the extent to which people have “staked” their self-esteem 
on particular domains, so people’s views of their worth depend on success or failure in the domains 
on which their self-esteem is contingent (Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, & Bouvrette, 2003; Crocker & 
Wolfe, 2001). Contingencies of self-worth are assessed by asking people to rate their self-esteem 
contingency in seven domains--others’ approval, appearance, competition, academic competence, 
family support, virtue (i.e., morals and ethics) and God’s love--indexed by their endorsement of items 
such as, “My self-esteem depends on the opinions others hold of me” (Crocker, Luhtanen et al., 2003; 
p. 899). People’s reports about their contingencies of self-worth predict many important outcomes. 
For example, women who were higher in contingency on others’ approval were more likely to join a 
sorority in university, and people more contingent on academic competence spent more time studying 
(Crocker, Luhtanen et al., 2003). Additionally, greater contingency on academic competence 
predicted stronger emotional reactions to academic successes and failures (Crocker, Karpinski, 
Quinn, & Chase, 2003; Crocker, Sommers & Luhtanen, 2002), and predicted academic problems in 
university when other important variables were controlled (Crocker, Karpinki et al., 2003).  
Self-esteem contingency theory has not focused on the specific sources of variation in self-
esteem contingencies across people. For example, Crocker and Wolfe (2001) stated that “personal 
standards such as contingencies of self-worth develop over the course of time in response to many 
social influences” (p.63). The major point at which my model deviates from contingency theory is 
that my sociometer perspective specifically states that acceptance from others determines self-esteem 
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contingencies. The attunement of self-esteem to specific traits thus is determined by what other 
people value in the occupants of a given social role.  
I am also skeptical of people’s explicit claims that their self-esteem is most contingent on 
virtue and least contingent on approval from others (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). People’s personal 
theories about their own psychology can be highly inaccurate (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Sedikides & 
Skowronski, 1995). Self-presentation concerns, self-deception, and lack of awareness of one’s own 
motives and of the influence of external cues are but a few of the factors that influence people's 
personal theories. For example, people hesitate to admit that feedback from others or social 
comparisons influence how they feel about themselves, probably because they believe that such 
admissions would make them look bad (Schoeneman, 1981; Wood, 1996). This hesitancy to admit 
that others’ opinions matter is also evident in people’s personal theories about contingencies of self-
worth. A measure assessing the urge to present oneself in a socially desirable light is negatively 
related to reported contingency on others’ approval, but is positively related to reported contingency 
on internal virtues (Crocker, Luhtanen et al., 2003). In addition, experimental evidence suggests that 
people’s personal theories about their self-esteem contingency on others' approval are at least partly 
invalid, because even people who claim to not care about others' approval clearly suffer when they 
are rejected (Leary et al., 2003). As Leary (2004) suggests, contingent self-esteem "often works 
outside people's conscious awareness" (p.12).  
So although reported self-esteem contingencies predict important social experiences, in some 
cases, people may not be aware of the factors that affect their self-esteem. This lack of awareness 
could lead to inaccuracy in people's personal theories about their self-esteem contingencies. I suspect 
that this is particularly the case when assessing contingency on "superficial" appearances and the 
“virtuous” communal qualities of kindness or understanding. Hence, I ask the question: Is self-esteem 
more attuned to traits that reflect one’s personal values, or to traits that garner acceptance from 
others? My sociometer perspective predicts the latter possibility. Moreover, as I have discussed 
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previously, my social-psychological model of the attunement of self-esteem also suggests that the 
specific traits that garner acceptance from others are influenced by one's social role.  
Overview of the Present Research 
Studies 1a, 1b, and 5 test whether SCs are perceived to be more socially valuable than CQs. 
In Studies 2 through 5, I use indirect methods to assess the attunement of self-esteem to specific 
interpersonal traits, to avoid the possible self-report biases that can occur when people describe their 
self-esteem contingencies. As the results will show, the greater attunement of self-esteem to SCs 
compared to CQs is evident in the correlation between self-esteem and self-beliefs, in the association 
between self-esteem and the cognitive accessibility of interpersonal traits, in the responsiveness of 
people’s self-concepts to social cues about the self, and in the manner that self-esteem affects social 
decision-making. But these studies also illustrate that humans are not utterly superficial creatures: 
When people occupy social roles that emphasize the value of CQs, self-esteem is also attuned to 
“what’s inside.” The results of these diverse studies converge to show that self-esteem reflects the 




Studies 1a and 1b: The Social Value of Traits 
People’s self-knowledge, including their sense of their own social value, is often biased and 
out of touch with objective reality (e.g., Tice & Wallace, 2003). Yet I suspect that many of the factors 
that bias self-knowledge (e.g., self-enhancement, ego-protection) are unlikely to affect people’s 
social-acceptance schemata, because social-acceptance schema are actually about other people, and 
what other people value, not about the self. Hence, I expect that people’s social-acceptance schema 
are actually quite accurate: People know what traits are valued by others. Evidence suggests that 
one’s possession of SCs influences one’s social outcomes to a greater degree than does one’s 
possession of CQs (e.g., Walster et al., 1973). In these studies I examine whether people’s social-
acceptance schemas are in touch with social reality. I predict that people are explicitly aware that SCs 
are generally more socially valuable than CQs. These studies test this hypothesis and, when possible, 
examine whether gender and ethnicity moderate the reported social value of traits.  
Study 1a: What “Others” Want in a Friend 
 
 This study assesses the perceived social value of traits. Undergraduate participants (N = 125; 
51% female) examined a randomly ordered list of 10 SCs (e.g., physically attractive, popular, 
interesting to talk to, athletic) and 10 CQs (responsive & supportive, loyal, understanding) and circled 
“the six traits that most other people are looking for in a friend.” Hence, this task did not assess 
people’s personal theories about their own values, but assessed their theories about what other people 
value, a method that should limit social-desirability or self-image concerns. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA indicated that participants believed that other people value SCs more than CQs in potential 
friends (Ms = 2.99 and 2.60, respectively; SDs = 0.90 and 0.98, respectively), F(1, 123) = 6.24, p < 
.014, η2 = .05. Gender did not moderate these findings, F < 1, although the means were in the 




Study 1b: Evaluation of Traits by Others 
 
 Another method of assessing the social value of traits is to assess the extent to which people 
believe that others are noticing or evaluating their traits. I hypothesize that in general, participants 
will report that others are evaluating their SCs more than their CQs, but that people of East Asian 
descent--who occupy a more interdependent social role than the Canadian norm--will report that 
others evaluate their CQs more than their SCs. I also expect that women will report more than men 
that their CQs are scrutinized.  
Participants (N = 63; 32% East Asian; 47% female) completed three-minute surveys at a 
student services center at the University of Waterloo and received a chocolate bar for their time. This 
sampling method allowed me to collect data that reflected a typical "slice of life" for students. 
Because participants reported spending similar amounts of time with strangers and friends (time with 
strangers M = 3.46, a little under “half the time;” time with friends M = 4.54, a little over “half the 
time”), both their SCs and CQs were potential targets of evaluation. Participants reported how often 
they thought that someone was noticing or evaluating their traits on a seven-point scale (1 - Never, 4 - 
Once an hour, 7 - Every minute), for either three SCs (“appearance or attractiveness,” “social skills,” 
“popularity or social status”) or three CQs (“kindness or understanding,” “warmth, lovingness, or 
supportiveness,” “honesty or loyalty”). Frequency of evaluation for SCs and CQs were averaged to 
form reliable domain composite scores (αs = .85 and .77, respectively).   
 A 2 x 2 (Trait Domain x Ethnicity) ANOVA revealed a significant cross-over interaction 
between trait domain and ethnicity, F(1, 54) = 7.15, p < .010, η2 = .12. Results are depicted in Figure 
1. As expected, participants of East Asian descent reported that others evaluated their CQs more than 
their SCs (Ms = 3.66 and 2.44, respectively; SDs = 1.75 and 1.08, respectively), F(1, 54) = 3.88, p < 
.051, but participants of other ethnicities (63% Caucasian) tended to report that their SCs were 
evaluated more than their CQs (Ms = 3.15 and 2.16, respectively; SDs = 1.42 and 0.87, respectively), 
F(1, 54) = 3.50, p < .063. Once again, gender did not moderate these findings, but the difference 
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Figure 1. Participants’ reports of how frequently they thought other people “noticed or 




The results of these studies indicate that people’s social-acceptance schemata reflect the 
social reality that SCs are more socially valuable than CQs. What about the moderating influence of 
interdependence on the perceived social value of CQs? Although results supported my hypothesis for 
people of East Asian decent--who reported that others noticed and evaluated their CQs more than 
their SCs--I did not find that gender moderated the reported social value of CQs in these studies. My 
theory does not require that women be explicitly aware of the increased social value of CQs relative 
to men. Social value could influence the attunement of self-esteem without influencing one’s personal 
theories, which are doubtless affected by many factors (e.g., social-desirability, lack of awareness). I 
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will return to this issue again in Study 2, when I examine the attunement of self-esteem to traits by 
assessing the association between self-esteem and people’s SC and CQ self-concepts. 
Even though people are aware that other people value SCs over CQs, they also maintain that 
CQs are more important to themselves than SCs. For example, I asked 279 introductory psychology 
students to rate the importance of CQs and SCs, and results indicated that people think that CQs are 
much more personally important than SCs (Ms = 6.06 and 4.70, respectively; Anthony, Holmes, & 
Wood, 2004). Moreover, participants in another study (N = 284) maintained that they would feel 
better following a compliment about their CQs than following a compliment about their SCs (Ms = 
2.86 and 2.31, respectively; Anthony et al., 2004). These personal theories are consistent with 
people’s explicitly reported self-esteem contingency, wherein people report that their self-esteem is 
more contingent on virtues than appearances (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). Hence, it appears that people 
are aware, and willing to admit, that others value SCs more than CQs, yet they also firmly maintain 
that CQs are more important to themselves than SCs. In the subsequent studies in this dissertation, I 
will seek to answer the question: Is self-esteem more attuned to traits that reflect people’s personal 
values, or to traits that garner acceptance from others?   
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Study 2: Explicit Self-Conceptions 
This study introduces a new measure of self-concept that assesses both SCs and CQs, and 
then examines the attunement of self-esteem to traits by assessing the association between trait 
domains of the self-concept and self-esteem. I also test whether social roles moderate the association 
between self-esteem and these domains.  
No existing measure of interpersonal self-concept assesses the wide range of traits relevant to 
my hypotheses. Usually, researchers assessing the social value of traits have focused either on a 
limited sample of socially-desired traits (often physical attractiveness), or have created a list of traits 
based on idiosyncratic criteria, which leads to little consistency across studies. Most studies also 
neglect traits that fall on the warmth dimension of the interpersonal circumplex (Wiggins, 1996), such 
as kindness or affection. Some measures also include items that reflect self-esteem in addition to the 
self-concept. For example, they use terms such as “worried” and “confident” or ask such questions as, 
“Have you ever felt ashamed of your physique or figure?” (Fleming & Courtney, 1984). Such 
mingling of self-beliefs and self-esteem precludes examination of how the self-concept relates to self-
esteem.  
To assess the shifting attunement of self-esteem across social roles, I created a new measure 
of self-rated interpersonal self-concept: The Social Attributes and Skills Inventory (SASI). To create 
the SASI, I used exploratory factor analyses with one sample of participants and confirmed my 
proposed factor structure on two additional samples. I also examined the correlation between self-
esteem and the SC and CQ aspects of the self-concept to ascertain whether I am correct to propose 
that for Westerners, the social nature of self-esteem means that self-esteem is more attuned to SCs 
than CQs. Moreover, I tested whether ethnicity, gender, and relationship status moderated the 






Sample 1 consisted of 442 participants (74% female, 78% Caucasian, M age = 18.8), Sample 
2 consisted of 221 participants (73% female, 74% Caucasian, M age = 19.1), and Sample 3 consisted 
of 644 participants (66% female; 50% Caucasian; M age = 19.8). Samples were drawn from separate 
Introductory Psychology classes at the University of Waterloo and students participated as part of a 
course requirement.  
Procedure 
 
During online mass-testing sessions, all participants completed Rosenberg's Self-Esteem 
Scale (1965), which I adapted to a nine-point response format from his original four-point format 
(and did so for every study in this dissertation). Approximately two-to-eight weeks later, at either in-
lab testing sessions (Sample 1) or online (Samples 2 and 3), participants rated themselves on trait 
adjectives. Samples 1 and 3 rated themselves “relative to other people” using a 100-point scale (0 - 
lower than the rest of the population, 100 - higher than the rest of the population). Sample 2 rated 
their traits using a seven-point scale (1 – Not at all descriptive of me, 7 – Extremely descriptive of 
me). Sample 1 rated themselves on 29 traits (15 SCs and 14 CQs). These adjectives reflected my 
definition of either SCs or CQs, and were drawn from research examining social exchange, mate 
selection, close relationships, and the self-concept (Baumgardner, 1990; Buss et al., 1990; Buss & 
Barnes, 1986; Campbell, 1990; Dutton & Brown, 1997; Fletcher, Simpson, Thomas, & Giles, 1999; 
Pelham & Swann, 1989; Reis & Shaver, 1988). Samples 2 and 3 rated themselves on 17 adjectives (9 
SCs and 8 CQs) that loaded highly onto the factors obtained from exploratory analyses on Sample 1. 
The specific traits assessed will be described in the Results section.1  
                                                
1     I have not included traits like “intelligent” and “educated” in my analyses. There is no doubt that 
intelligence is a valued trait, but it does not readily fit my definition of SCs or CQs: “intelligent” and “educated” 
fall between the SCs and CQs in terms of observability (Anthony et. al, 2004), and correlate equally with both 
domains. Although assessing such traits does not fit my present purposes, I hope future researchers study them 





Factor loadings of CQ and SC  traits from exploratory analysis  
 Factor 
Trait 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Tolerant .84 .41 .32 .30 .48 .04 
Understanding .81 .65 .45 .38 .68 -.05 
Accepting .72 .52 .43 .35 .60 .03 
Kind .71 .62 .44 .34 .68 -.06 
Patient .67 .32 .28 .24 .36 .12 
Adaptable .52 .33 .40 .34 .28 .17 
Loving .46 .86 .53 .44 .63 .09 
Affectionate .40 .82 .51 .38 .48 .24 
Warm .51 .82 .52 .39 .46 .12 
Responsive & Supportive .60 .77 .47 .39 .61 -.03 
Open & Disclosing .41 .56 .43 .31 .41 .23 
Sociable .41 .51 .91 .53 .38 .33 
Socially skilled .36 .50 .82 .48 .33 .42 
Interesting to talk to .45 .56 .80 .58 .45 .30 
Exciting personality .26 .45 .70 .55 .30 .35 
Good sense of humor .38 .42 .64 .51 .45 .22 
Sexy .19 .34 .47 .84 .21 .49 
Physically attractive .26 .38 .53 .81 .30 .52 
Charming .32 .45 .61 .74 .34 .40 
Stylish appearance .26 .36 .55 .61 .31 .52 
Healthy .37 .32 .50 .61 .44 .25 
Physically Active .29 .19 .36 .60 .19 .27 
Loyal .47 .50 .34 .28 .81 .05 
Honest .49 .49 .36 .33 .77 .08 
Considerate .65 .59 .47 .38 .69 .02 
Popular .20 .34 .58 .59 .20 .74 
Social Status .35 .36 .58 .52 .28 .66 
Wealthy .16 .19 .28 .42 .20 .61 
Note. Bold numbers represent the highest factor loadings for each trait. 
Factor 1, 2, and 5 are composed of CQs, and Factors 3, 4, and 6 are 
composed of SCs. 
 
Results and Discussion  
Factor Analyses of the SASI 
 
First, I conducted an exploratory factor analysis using Principal Axis Factoring with Promax 
rotation, a method well suited to extracting correlated factors. Six factors with eigen values over one 
were extracted that accounted for 67% of the variance. The traits and loadings are listed in Table 1. 
 
 16 
Consistent with my hypothesis, CQs and SCs loaded onto separate factors, with the former 
composing the first, second, and fifth factors, and the latter composing the third, fourth, and sixth 
factors. Examination of the factor structure also indicated that most traits loaded highly onto all three 
factors within a domain. For example, “kind” loaded most strongly onto the first factor, but was 
almost as strongly related to the traits in the second and fifth factors. I computed average factor 
scores, correlated each of the factors with all the others, and then used Fischer’s r to z transformation 
to determine that the average correlation between CQ factors (i.e., Factors 1, 2, and 5) was .61 and the 
average correlation between SC factors (i.e., Factors 3, 4, and 6) was .62, but the average correlation 
between CQ and SC factors was .44. This led me to hypothesize that although six factors emerged 
from the exploratory factor analysis, these six factors could be further grouped into SC and CQ 
domains. I tested the fit of such a model using Samples 2 and 3, and the model that I tested is depicted 
in Figure 2. 
 Using Structural Equation Modeling, I modeled two latent domains, one SC domain and one 
CQ domain, which were correlated with one another. These domains were each modeled to predict 
three latent factors. For the CQ domain, the observed variables “kind & understanding,” “patient,” 
and “accepting” loaded onto the first factor, “warm,” “affectionate,” and “loving” loaded onto the 
second factor, and the variables “loyal” and “honest” loaded onto the third. For the SC domain, 
“exciting personality,” “socially skilled,” and “interesting to talk to” loaded onto the first factor, 
“sexy,” “physically attractive,” and “physically active” loaded onto the second, and “popular,” “social 
status,” and “wealthy” loaded onto the third factor. For Sample 2, this model fit the data well, χ2(112, 
N = 221) = 229.14, p < .001, CFI = .93 and RMSEA = .07,2 and the estimated correlation between the 
SC and CQ latent domains was moderate, r = .51, p < .001.  
                                                
2     Given my large sample sizes, the Chi-square test is not a good index of fit, so I report the CFI and the 









































I compared this two-domain model, which left the correlation between SC and CQ domains 
unconstrained, to a nested model that specified that the correlation between the SC and CQ domains 
was 1.00. This alternate model tested the possibility that a single self-concept domain predicted the  
six factors. This model did not fit the data as well, χ²(113, N = 221) = 274.7, p < .001, and represented 
a significant decrease in goodness-of-fit, Δχ²(1, N = 221) = 45.52, p < .001. The same results were 
obtained for the unconstrained model with Sample 3: χ2(112, N = 644) = 307.17, p < .001, CFI = .94, 
RMSEA = .04. Again, the latent SC and CQ domains were correlated, r = .61, p < .001, but 
constraining the correlation to equal 1.00 resulted in poorer fit: χ²(113, N = 644) = 317.47, p < .001, 
Δχ²(1, N = 644) = 10.30, p < .001. Hence, I conclude that my two-domain organization of these factors 
is a good fit for the data.3 
 Based on these results, in subsequent analyses I computed mean SC and CQ scores by 
averaging people’s self-ratings on the traits that fall within those domains. Reliabilities of these 
domain scores are typically very high (αs = .80 to .90), and the correlation between domain self-
ratings are moderate (rs = .40 to .55). To ensure that I accurately assess the domains, I always assess 
traits drawn from each of the three factors within the SC and CQ domains. Additionally, although I 
will present data that use SC and CQ domain total scores, the results look the same if I compute six 
factor scores: Results for the three CQ factors are consistent, and results for the three SC factors are 
consistent. 
                                                
3     Further analyses suggested to me that relationship status, gender, and ethnicity do not moderate the factor 
structure, indicated by good indices of fit across groups. Sample 1: Singles--CFI = .94, RMSEA = .06; In 
Relationships--CFI = .91, RMSEA = .07. Sample 3: Men--CFI = .95, RMSEA = .03; Women--CFI = .92, 




Self-Concept and Self-Esteem 
 
Using data from Sample 1, I also examined the correlation between Western (i.e., Caucasians 
born in Canada; n = 320) participants’ self-esteem and their self-concepts, to establish the base-line 
association between self-esteem and SCs and CQs for Westerners. Overall, global self-esteem (M = 
6.86; SD = 1.28) correlated moderately with the SC self-concept (M = 66.87; SD = 10.74), r = .28, p 
< .001, R2 = .08, and weakly with the CQ self-concept (M = 77.82; SD = 10.67), r = .13, p < .022, R2 
= .02. The difference between these two non-independent correlations was significant, t(319) = 2.85, 
p < .002. This novel finding contradicts the generally held belief that LSEs have universally more 
negative self-concepts than HSEs: I find that LSEs’ self-beliefs about CQs are nearly as positive as 
HSEs’, reflecting the generally greater value placed on SCs, compared to CQs, in Western culture.  
Moderation by Ethnicity and Gender 
  
Using data from Sample 3, I examined the moderating influence of gender and ethnicity on 
the attunement of self-esteem to CQs.4 I predicted that self-esteem is attuned to SCs for all 
participants, and that this association is not moderated by culture or gender, but that East Asians have 
self-esteem more attuned to their CQs than Westerners, and women have self-esteem more attuned to 
their CQs than men.  
Sample 3 participants included 307 Caucasians born in Canada (my "Western" sample, 65% 
female) and 157 Asians born in East Asia (my "East Asian" sample, 68% female). In addition to 
scales assessing self-esteem and self-concept, East Asian participants indicated the strength of their 
identification with their East Asian ethnic group (e.g., Chinese, Taiwanese, Korean) and all 
participants rated the strength of their identification with Canadian culture in general (both scales: 0 -  
                                                
4     Readers may wonder why I did not test all of my moderation hypotheses on all three Samples. I used data 
from Sample 1 to establish the base-line correlation between self-esteem and SCs and CQs for Westerners 
because such detailed ethnicity information was not available for Sample 2, and because Sample 3 data was 
used to test the moderation by ethnicity and gender hypotheses. Moreover, I used Sample 3 data to test the 
moderation by ethnicity and gender hypotheses because Samples 1 and 2 did not include any Asian born Asians. 
Finally, I used Sample 1 to test the moderation by relationship status hypothesis because relationship status data 
was not available for the other samples. 
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not at all, 10 - very much). As anticipated, East Asian participants were more identified with their 
Asian ethnic group than with Canadian culture in general (Ms = 7.95 and 6.76, respectively; SDs = 
1.77 and 2.13, respectively), F(1, 153) = 30.26, p < .001, η2 = .17.    
To examine the attunement of self-esteem to these traits, I first ran a hierarchical regression 
in which mean-centered self-esteem, dummy coded gender (female = 0, male = 1), dummy coded 
ethnicity (Western = 0, East Asian = 1), and the interactions between the variables were used to 
predict the difference between participants’ CQ and SC self-ratings. This technique allowed me to 
examine whether there was a Self-esteem x Gender x Trait Domain interaction (which would result if 
gender moderated the association between self-esteem and CQs but not SCs), and whether there was a 
Self-esteem x Ethnicity x Trait Domain interaction (which would result if ethnicity moderated the 
association between self-esteem and CQs but not SCs). Results confirmed these hypotheses, with a 
significant Self-esteem x Gender interaction predicting the difference between participants’ CQs and 
SCs, ß = .17, t(463) = 2.26, p < .024, and a significant Self-esteem x Ethnicity interaction, ß = .14, 
t(463) =  2.63, p < .009. 
To further decompose these interactions, two hierarchical regressions were performed that 
used mean-centered self-esteem, dummy coded gender (female = 0, male = 1), dummy coded 
ethnicity (Western = 0, East Asian = 1), and the interactions between the variables to predict either 
SCs or CQs. In this hierarchical procedure, I entered main-effects at Step 1. At Step 2, two-way 
interactions were added to the equation, and at Step 3 I added the three-way interaction as a predictor. 
If the three-way interaction was not significant, I interpreted the two-way interactions that were 
entered at Step 2. If the 2-way interactions were not significant, I interpreted and reported the main-
effects from Step 1. In these analyses I am primarily interested in examining how the slope of the 
association between self-esteem and self-concept varies as a function of gender and ethnicity: Steeper 
slopes represent a stronger association between self-esteem and self-concept, which is one indicator 
of the attunement of self-esteem to particular traits. 
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Social Commodities. A main effect of self-esteem replicated my previous finding that people 
higher in self-esteem rate themselves higher in SCs (predicted Ms: -1 SD = 2.84 and +1 SD = 4.12), ß 
= .48, t(463) = 12.11, p < .001, R2 = .23. Also, women rated themselves higher in SCs than men (Ms 
= 3.52 and 3.35, respectively; both SDs = 1.08), ß = .08, t(463) = 2.13, p < .034, R2 = .01, and 
Westerners rated themselves higher in SCs than did East Asians (Ms = 3.65 and 3.09, respectively; 
both SDs = 1.05), ß = -.19,  t(463) = -4.81, p < .001, R2 = .04. Neither gender nor ethnicity moderated 
the association between self-esteem and SCs. 
Communal Qualities. As anticipated, both gender and ethnicity moderated the association 
between self-esteem and CQs, ß = .14, t(463) = 1.89, p < .059, R2 = .01, and ß = .12,  t(463) = 2.27, p 
< .023, R2 = .01. Results are graphed in Figure 3. Men’s self-esteem was not related to CQs (predicted 
Ms: -1 SD = 4.83 and +1 SD 4.93), t(463) < 1, whereas women’s self-esteem was associated with CQ 
self-ratings (predicted Ms: -1 SD = 4.92 and +1 SD = 5.36), t(463) = 3.28, p < .009. Also, Westerners’ 
self-esteem was not generally related to CQs (predicted Ms: -1 SD = 4.83 and +1 SD 4.93), t(463) < 1, 
but East Asians’ self-esteem was attuned to CQs (predicted Ms: -1 SD = 4.28 and +1 SD 4.80), t(463) 
< 3.74, p < .001. A three-way interaction of gender, ethnicity, and self-esteem did not emerge, ß = -
.04, t < 1.5  
Moderation by Relationship Status 
  
Next, I tested whether the association between self-concept and self-esteem was moderated 
by relationship status. I hypothesized that the relation between self-esteem and CQs is stronger for 
people in relationships than for singles, because people in relationships occupy a particularly salient 
social role that emphasizes interdependence, which should increase the social value of traits such as 
kindness and understanding. 
 
                                                
5     Restriction of range does not appear to have influenced these results, because all groups of participants had 
similar ranges in self-esteem and CQs (Western women: 1.31 and 0.87, respectively; Western men: 1.40 and 
0.97, respectively; East Asian women: 1.25 and 1.00, respectively; East Asian men: 1.36 and 0.99, 





Figure 3. Top Panel: Graph depicting the two-way interaction between gender and self-esteem 
predicting Communal Quality self-ratings in Study 2. Bottom Panel: Graph depicting the two-
way interaction between ethnicity and self-esteem predicting Communal Quality self-ratings in 




Relationship status data were available for 311 (77 males, 234 females) of the Caucasian 
participants in Sample 1. Approximately half of the participants were in relationships, and this 


























of self-esteem, CQs, and SCs were similar for single people (Ms = 6.80. 77.94, and 67.18, 
respectively; SDs = 1.41, 10.87, and 10.46, respectively) and people in relationships (Ms = 6.92, 
77.70, and 66.56, respectively; SDs = 1.15, 10.57, and 11.07, respectively). In this case, the 
regression in which self-esteem (mean-centered), relationship status (single = 0, in relationship = 1), 
and the interaction between these variables were used to predict the difference between people’s CQs 
and SCs did not reveal the expected Self-esteem x Relationship Status x Trait Domain interaction, ß = 
-.05, t < 1. However, as I reported previously when examining the base-line association between 
domains for Westerners, in Sample 1 the association between self-esteem and self-concept is modest, 
and so detecting a Self-esteem x Relationship Status x Trait Domain interaction could be difficult. 
Hence, to test my a priori hypothesis that relationship status moderates the association between self-
esteem and CQs, not SCs, two separate hierarchical regression analyses were performed, one in which 
SCs were the dependent variable and one in which CQs were the dependent variable. In both cases, 
the variables of self-esteem (mean-centered), relationship status (single = 0, in relationship = 1), and 
the interaction between these variables were used as predictors.  
Relationship status did not directly relate to either domain of interpersonal value, both ts < 1. 
As predicted, relationship status did not moderate the association between self-esteem and the SC 
self-concept, t(310) = 1.41, ns, but did moderate the relation between self-esteem and the CQ self-
concept, ß =.15, t(310) = 2.01, p < .023, R2 = .02. This interaction is graphed in Figure 4. For single 
participants, the simple slope of the relation between self-esteem and CQs was not significant, ß = 
.04, t(310) = .52, whereas for participants in relationships, the simple slope was significant, ß = .27, 
t(310) = 3.03, p < .003. Relative to their single counterparts, HSEs in relationships tended to rate 






Figure 4. Graph depicting the two-way interaction between relationship status and self-esteem 
predicting Communal Quality self-ratings in Study 2.  
 
 
From this correlational study, the causal explanation for the Relationship Status x Self-
Esteem interaction on CQs is impossible to ascertain. One possibility is that the type of person who 
starts a romantic relationship already has an interdependent self-construal, and that LSEs with more 
negative CQ self-views, but HSEs with more positive CQ self-views, are especially likely to be in 
romantic relationships. However, my preferred explanation is that the intimate context of a romantic 
relationship highlights the importance of CQs for acceptance. When assessing their interpersonal 
value, people focus on traits that, when single, flew under their evaluative radar. I speculate that when 
people's evaluative attention is drawn to the self, self-esteem tends to pull those evaluations in a self-
























Study 3: Cognitive Accessibility of Traits 
This study tests whether the differential attunement of self-esteem to SCs over CQs is also 
evident in the cognitive accessibility of traits. This method is less susceptible to reporting biases than 
the self-reports that I used in Study 2. Hence these results may offer convergent evidence for my 
arguments. 
As in previous research, I examined the cognitive accessibility of trait adjectives via response 
latencies on a “me-not me” trait-categorization task (e.g., Markus, 1977). Based on evidence that the 
most accessible traits are central to one’s self-concept (Markus, 1977), reflect strongly held, clear 
beliefs (Campbell, 1990), and represent personal strengths, rather than weaknesses (Dodgson & 
Wood, 1998), I expect that everyone will be very quick to claim to possess CQs. These traits are 
important aspects of the self-concept, very high in clarity (Anthony et al., 2007), and people regard 
them as personal strengths (i.e., scoring in excess of the 80th percentile relative to the population). 
Self-esteem, which is related only modestly to Westerners’ CQ self-beliefs, should not moderate the 
accessibility of CQs, but gender should; women’s self-esteem should relate to the cognitive 
accessibility of CQs. 
I hypothesized that for SCs, self-esteem will be related to accessibility of self-beliefs. HSEs 
think that SCs are personal strengths (i.e., self-ratings in excess of the 75th percentile), suggesting that 
they will be very fast to claim to possess SCs. LSEs’ more equivocal stance about their possession of 





 Ninety-five (52% female) Canadian born Caucasian undergraduate students participated in 
exchange for course credit. Participants scored in the top third (HSE; M = 4.73; n = 53) and bottom 





Participants completed a computer task in individual lab sessions. The computer task 
instructed participants to categorize traits as either “me” or “not me” based on their “first instinct,” 
but without responding so quickly that they made many errors. Response latencies and response 
choice (“me” or “not me”) were recorded. Participants first categorized 15 practice adjectives, which 
did not fall into either the SC or CQ domains, and then categorized 36 trait adjectives: 15 filler traits 
(including 10 negative adjectives), 11 SCs, and 10 CQs. The sequence of adjectives within the 
practice and experimental trials was randomized for each participant.  
Results  
Two participants showed extreme scores on single items that may have indicated a lapse in 
attention to the task, and so these responses were treated as missing data in analyses.6 Following 
Fazio (1990), individual response latencies were logarithmically transformed. The response latencies 
for “me” and “not me” responses within each domain were then averaged. This resulted in four 
response latency scores for each participant (“me” and “not me” latencies for SCs, and for CQs).  
The infrequency of “not me” categorizations for CQs, particularly for HSE women (only five 
of 27 HSE women made at least one “not me” CQ categorization, compared to 12 of 22 LSE women), 
precluded the examination of gender difference in response latencies to CQs. Additionally, because 
only 16 HSEs and 22 LSEs actually made even one “not me” CQ categorization decision, a within-
person analysis that included trait Domain as a predictor would have included only 40% of my 
sample. Therefore, for each domain of traits, CQs and SCs, I conducted a 2 x 2 (Self-Esteem x “Me” 
vs. “Not me” Response Latencies) repeated-measures ANOVA, wherein self-esteem was the 
between-subjects variable and log-transformed response latencies for “me” and “not me” decisions 
were the within-subjects variable. 
                                                
6     One participant was an outlier on “physically attractive” and the other was an outlier for “popular.”  Both of 
these latencies were extreme in the predicted direction (i.e., an LSE making a “me” decision, and an HSE 
making a “not me” decision), so their removal works against obtaining my hypothesized results.  
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As predicted, self-esteem was not related to response latencies for CQs, nor did it moderate 
the accessibility of CQ categorization decisions, both Fs < 1. Overall, people were faster to categorize 
CQs as “me” than “not me” (Ms = 1226.29 and 2105.25, respectively; SDs = 437.54 and 1491.25), 
F(1, 38) = 10.67, p < .002, η2 = .22. In contrast, self-esteem moderated the extent to which “me” and 
“not me” SC categorizations were accessible, F(1, 81) = 12.65, p < .001, η2 = .13. A graph of the 
untransformed response latencies for SCs can be seen in Figure 5. LSEs’ categorizations of me/not 
me were equally accessible (Ms = 1543.34 and 1638.08, respectively; SDs = 622.28 and 764.35, 
respectively), F < 1, whereas HSEs’ “me” categorizations were more accessible than their “not me” 
categorizations (Ms = 1326.11 and 1639.45, respectively; SDs = 402.17 and 739.50, respectively), 
F(1, 81) = 18.87, p < .001.7  
Discussion 
These results suggest that the attunement of self-esteem to SCs is apparent not only in explicit 
self-ratings, but in the very manner that people process self-relevant information. Whereas everyone 
was faster to categorize CQs as “me” than “not me,” only HSEs showed this same pattern for SCs. In 
contrast, LSEs showed similar response latencies for both “me” and “not me” SC categorizations. 
This suggests that HSEs may be SC schematic, whereas LSEs are not schematic on SCs (see Markus, 
1977). Interestingly, if self-esteem is considered to represent an acceptance self-schema (Baldwin, 
1992), as sociometer theory suggests, and SCs to represent acceptance adjectives, as I hypothesize, 
then this pattern of response latencies nicely mirrors Markus’s (1977) classic findings. In her 
research, “dependents” had more trouble accessing their independent strengths than did 
                                                
7     These results are replicated with a 3-factor ANOVA conducted on only the 38 participants who made “not 
me” CQ categorizations. As anticipated, people were faster to categorize traits as “me” than “not me”, F(1, 36) 
= 27.16, p < .001, and this effect was larger for CQs than SCs (due to the very long response latencies for CQ 
“not me” decisions), F(1, 36) = 14.83, p < .001, but these effects were qualified by a marginally significant 
Self-Esteem x Trait Domain x Response Choice interaction, F(1, 36) = 2.46, p < .126. For CQs, strengths were 
more accessible than weaknesses for both LSEs (Ms = 1260 and 2164, respectively; SDs = 510 and 1458, 
respectively), F(1, 23) = 24.95, p < .001, and HSEs (Ms = 1163 and 1887, respectively; SDs =  356 and 1643, 
respectively), F(1, 15) = 9.47, p < .007. For SCs, LSEs’ strengths and weaknesses were equally accessible (Ms 
= 1611 and 1525, respectively; SDs = 676 and 472, respectively), F < 1, whereas HSEs’ strengths were more 
accessible than weaknesses (Ms = 1360 and 1657, respectively; SDs = 439 and 686, respectively), F(1, 15) = 
7.56, p < .015.  
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“independents,” and in my research LSEs had more trouble accessing their acceptance strengths than 




























Figure 5. Response latencies for Social Commodity traits as a function of response choice 
and self-esteem in Study 3. Note. Bars represent untransformed response latencies.  
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Study 4: Responsiveness of the Self-Concept to Social Cues  
This study assesses the attunement of self-esteem to traits by examining the responsiveness of 
the self-concept to social cues about the self. Predicting future acceptance or rejection would be 
facilitated if one’s self-views about socially valuable traits reflected others’ opinions. But if people 
are motivated to incorporate others’ opinions of their traits into their self-concepts, what happens 
when two different people provide conflicting social cues about the self? This situation is easily 
resolved if the sources of the conflicting opinions differ in how well they know the target person, 
because the target can easily dismiss the opinion of the less knowledgeable observer. But if the 
conflicting social cues come from people who know the target very well, then the target cannot 
resolve the conflict simply by dismissing one person’s opinion. In such a situation, I believe that 
conflicting social cues about the self undermine one’s confidence in one’s possession of socially 
valuable traits, resulting in less positive self-views.  
To test this hypothesis, in the present study I use a multiple-reporters method (a lá Kenny, 
1994) to assess parents’ and romantic partners’ opinions of the participants’ traits; such ratings are an 
indirect indication of the type of social cues that participants receive about their traits from their 
parent and partner. If a parent and romantic partner do not agree in their assessment of the 
participant’s traits (e.g., mom thinks her son is a 95, but girlfriend thinks he is an 85), then they will 
convey divergent social cues about the participant’s possession of said traits. Parents and romantic 
partners tend to hold unrealistically positive views of their loved one’s traits (typically in excess of 
the 80th percentile; Logel, Holmes, Anthony, Wood, & Cameron, 2006), and these highly positive 
illusions can have beneficial effects on their loved one’s psychological well-being (e.g., Murray et al., 
2006). However, I suggest that even if one’s parent and romantic partner hold very positive views of 
one’s traits, if they disagree, it calls into question the validity of their positive assessments and 
contradicts social norms about the positive biases that close loved ones should harbour about one’s 
worth. Thus, divergent social cues about the self may be associated with less confidently held self-
views, which will be evident in less positive self-views.  
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However, I expect that the attunement of self-esteem to SCs over CQs means that self-
concept responsiveness to social cues will be moderated by trait domain and self-esteem. First, 
because self-esteem is strongly attuned to SCs, I expect that LSEs’ self-concepts will be more 
responsive to divergent SC cues than will HSEs’ self-concepts. LSEs are more concerned with 
acceptance than HSEs, and so they should pay particular attention to social cues about their SCs and 
have SC self-concepts that are particularly responsive to divergent social cues. In contrast, because 
HSEs are less concerned with acceptance from others than LSEs, HSEs should not monitor others’ 
opinions about their traits to the same degree as LSEs. Thus HSEs’ SC self-concepts will be 
unresponsive to divergent social cues. Second, because CQs are less predictive of acceptance than 
SCs, I hypothesize that people’s self-concepts will be less responsive to divergent CQ cues than to 
divergent SC cues. Furthermore, because self-esteem is less attuned to CQs than SCs, I do not expect 
self-esteem to moderate self-concept responsiveness to CQ cues.8  
Method 
Participants 
 Participants in this study (N = 37; 57% female), all of whom were in romantic relationships, 
nominated both their romantic partner and one parent to participate in the study. Participants received 
partial course credit for their time. All participants were between 17 and 23 years of age, were born in 
Canada, and English was their first language. The average age of parents (78% female) was 49 years, 
and the average age of partners (43% female) was 19. The significant others received a ballot in a 
draw for prizes in appreciation for their participation.  
  
                                                
8     It was very difficult to obtain data for this study, given that it required both parent and partner ratings of 
each participant, and so the small sample size obtained (N = 36) precluded an examination of gender effects on 




 Participants completed an online survey that included a questionnaire asking them to rate 
themselves on a number of trait adjectives “relative to other people” using a 100-point scale (0 - 
lower than the rest of the population, 50 - average for this characteristic, 100 - higher than the rest of 
the population). This questionnaire included four SCs (“physically attractive,” “popular,” “sexy,” and 
“socially skilled”)9 and five CQs (“kind,” “honest,” “responsive & supportive,” “loving,” and 
“warm”). The online surveys that the parents and partners completed included a questionnaire asking 
them to rate the target participant (i.e., their romantic partner or their child) on the same nine trait-
adjectives, using the same scales. Participants also completed Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale 
(1965).10 
Results  
Discrepancies between significant others’ views of participants’ traits were indexed by 
computing the absolute difference between parents’ and romantic partners’ ratings of each trait and 
then averaging these absolute difference scores for CQs and SCs separately. These domain 
discrepancy scores were moderately correlated with one another, r = .50, p = .002. Next, for each 
domain of traits separately, regression analysis was used to predict participants’ self-ratings from 
participants’ mean-centered self-esteem, mean-centered significant-other absolute discrepancy for 
that domain, and the interaction between the variables. This analysis allowed me to examine the 
relation between parent-partner discrepancies and participants’ self-conceptions.  
Although self-esteem (M = 7.22, SD = 1.34) was positively related to CQ self-conceptions (M 
= 78.58, SD = 12.45), ß = .49, t(36) = 2.85, p < .007, significant-other discrepancies (M = 14.88, SD 
= 8.60) were not associated with CQ self-conceptions, ß = .15,  t(36) = .86, ns, and self-esteem and 
discrepancies did not interact, ß = -.13,  t(36) < 1. For SCs, self-esteem was also positively related to 
self-conceptions (M = 61.93, SD = 15.60), ß = .54, t(36) = 4.59, p < .001. However, as predicted, 
                                                
9     The results that I will report shortly are the same if I exclude the term “sexy” from SC total scores.  
10    Additional scales were included in all questionnaires but are not relevant to the current hypothesis.  
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absolute discrepancies about SCs (M = 18.94, SD = 10.48) were strongly and uniquely associated 
with SC self-conceptions, ß = -.53, t(36) = -3.98, p <.001. Moreover, the predicted interaction 
between self-esteem and absolute discrepancy was marginally-significant, ß = .23, t(36) = 1.71, p = 
.097, and qualified these main-effects. This interaction is depicted in Figure 6. For HSEs (i.e., +1 SD), 
absolute discrepancies between significant-others’ views of one’s SCs were only weakly associated 
with one’s self-conceptions, ß = -.25, t(36) = -1.60, p = .122, but for LSEs (i.e., -1 SD), absolute 
























                                                
11     It is true that CQ self-ratings and significant-other discrepancies had less variance than SC self-ratings and 
significant-other discrepancies, and thus restriction of range could explain the observed domain difference in 
self-concept responsiveness to social cues. Yet CQ self-ratings and significant-other discrepancies had enough 
variance to correlate moderately with self-esteem and significant-other discrepancies for SCs, respectively, 
suggesting that restriction of range is not a serious confound in these results. 
Figure 6. Participants’ self-ratings as a function of participants’ self-esteem and the absolute 
level of discrepancy between parent and partner SC-ratings of participants in Study 4.  
Note. Self-esteem and rater discrepancies were both plotted for values one standard deviation 




As hypothesized, participant’s self-concepts were much more responsive to inconsistent cues 
about SCs than CQs, and the attunement of self-esteem to traits that garner acceptance was evident in 
the finding that LSEs were more responsive to discrepant SC cues than HSEs. This latter finding is 
consistent with Brockner’s (1984) concept of LSE plasticity, which proposes that LSEs are more 
susceptible to social influence than HSEs. My results offer an amendment to Brockner’s theory, 
suggesting that LSEs are the most responsive to feedback about traits that are especially relevant to 
garnering acceptance from others: the SCs. 
Given that the participants in this study are all in romantic relationships, and, as the results of 
Study 2 illustrated, self-esteem is attuned to CQs for people in romantic relationships, one might have 
expected participants’ CQ self-concepts to be responsive to divergent social cues about CQs, and for 
self-esteem to moderate the strength of this responsiveness. However, the responsiveness of one’s  
self-concept to external influences is dependent on the clarity of one’s self-concept. Self-concept 
clarity refers to the extent to which one’s beliefs about one’s attributes are clear, confidently 
held,internally consistent, stable, and cognitively accessible (Campbell, 1990; Campbell, Trapnell, 
Heine, Katz, Lavalee, & Lehman, 1996). My research examining self-concept clarity indicates that 
people have much higher clarity about their CQs than about their SCs: CQ self-concepts are more 
extreme, more confidently held, and more internally consistent than SC self-concepts, and people 
show less deviation between general and situation-specific self-beliefs for CQs than for SCs 
following an actual social interaction (Anthony et al., 2007). Interestingly, self-esteem does not 
moderate trait domain differences in self-concept clarity: Both LSEs and HSEs have highly clear CQ 
self-views, and less clear SC self-views. Thus, in the present study, high self-concept clarity may 
explain why CQ self-views were unresponsive to discrepant social cues. Moreover, although the 
attunement of self-esteem to CQs for people in relationships appears to cause LSEs to hold more 
negative CQ self-views than HSEs, people’s CQ self-views are so clearly and confidently held that 
both HSEs and LSEs have CQ self-views that are unresponsive to divergent social cues.  
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As with all correlational studies, causal direction cannot be established. It is possible that 
people who are less confident about their possession of SCs engender more varied opinions about 
those traits in their close others. But this causal alternative cannot explain why the same effect is not 
seen for CQs. Instead, I believe that these results support my contention that people’s self-




Study 5: Social Decision Making 
In the current study I used a behavioral method to test whether the attunement of self-esteem 
to traits reflects the social value of traits. In this study, I invited female participants to join a market 
research focus group with four current members. Recall that SCs are generally more socially valuable 
than CQs, even for women. Therefore, I hypothesize that if women believe that a group of strangers 
they are about to meet already holds a positive view of their SCs, they will strongly anticipate 
acceptance, especially because SCs are particularly important for garnering acceptance from strangers 
who cannot quickly and easily assess CQs. In contrast, because CQs are not relevant to acceptance in 
first impression situations, believing that the group already holds a positive view of their CQs will not 
increase women’s anticipated acceptance from the group relative to their base line expectations.  
I also predict that self-esteem will moderate women’s social decision-making processes. 
LSEs typically doubt that they will be valued by new people they meet (Leary & Baumeister, 2000; 
Leary et al., 1995). Moreover, although interpersonal rejection is painful for everyone, it is especially 
damaging to LSEs (e.g., MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Nezlek, Kowalski, Leary, Belvins, & Holgate, 
1997; Sommer & Baumeister, 2002), who cannot afford additional drops in their already depleted 
sociometers. To avoid such drops, LSEs adopt a preventive, self-protective orientation (Baumeister et 
al., 1989; Heimpel, Elliot, & Wood, 2006): They are very attentive to social cues regarding the 
possibility of rejection (Pickett, Gardner, & Knowles, 2004), and are more hesitant than HSEs to enter 
social situations unless acceptance in virtually guaranteed (Anthony et al., 2007; Murray et al., 2006). 
Based on this self-protective social orientation, I predict that LSEs will be very sensitive to the 
difference in the potential for acceptance from the group following SC versus CQ feedback. If a 
positive assessment of their SCs by a group of strangers makes LSEs certain that they will be 
accepted, as I hypothesize, LSEs should be strongly drawn to the group that gives them SC feedback. 
In contrast, if LSEs do not believe that CQs are a guarantee of acceptance from strangers, as I predict, 
then joining the group that provides CQ feedback will not be as appealing to them, because the risk of 
rejection will not be sufficiently low for them to eagerly enter the social situation. Although women’s 
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self-esteem is more attuned to CQs than is men’s self-esteem, women’s self-esteem is still more 
attuned to SCs than to CQs. Hence I expect that the LSE women in this study will prefer to join the 
SC feedback group over the CQ feedback group, because SCs are more predictive of acceptance than 
CQs.   
In contrast, HSEs feel that they are typically well-liked and they expect to be liked in the 
future (Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary et al., 1995). These feelings act as an emotional buffer 
against all but the most obvious rejection cues. I believe that this psychological insurance policy 
against potential rejection allows HSEs to adopt a high threshold for acceptable social risk, which 
permits them to enter a novel social situation with little anxiety about possible rejection. HSEs’ social 
decision-making is consequently less contingent on social cues of acceptance or rejection than is 
LSEs’ social decision-making (e.g., Anthony et al., 2007). Hence, in the current study I predict that 
HSEs will be less sensitive than LSEs to the differences in the potential for acceptance conveyed by 
the SC and CQ feedback, and will not base their social decision-making on the degree of acceptance 
that they anticipate. In contrast to people’s personal theories about the importance of traits, I expect 




 During a mass-testing session, Introductory Psychology students at the University of 
Waterloo completed, among other questionnaires, Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale (1965). Participants 
in the current study were women selected from the top third (HSEs, M = 8.01, n = 28) and bottom 
third (LSEs, M = 5.13, n = 30) of the distribution of scores.  
Procedure 
  
Participants were telephoned and invited to an individual lab session to participate in a study 
about “Group Dynamics.” The researcher who ran the experimental session was blind to both 
participants’ self-esteem and SC/CQ feedback condition (although she did know when participants 
were in the control condition, because this condition required a slightly different procedure, as will be 
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described shortly). An elaborate cover story was devised to make the decision-making context 
realistic and meaningful. In the lab, the participant was told that the female experimenter was a 
representative of the “Center for Group Dynamics,” and that she was currently recruiting a 
replacement member for a five-person market research focus group. She informed the participant that 
her lab runs market research because “[it] allows us to collect data on group dynamics, which is my 
primary interest in this lab. So there are really two things going on here--our research on group 
dynamics, and the focus group.” The participant was informed that the focus group meets about once 
a month to assess a product, and that group members usually get to keep the product that they assess 
(e.g., running shoes, cell phones).  
Next, the experimenter showed a short video of another group meeting (i.e., not the group 
that the participant could join), to give the participant “an idea of what the meetings are like.” The 
tape was about one minute long and showed a mixed-gender group “testing” cell phones, eating pizza, 
and having a good time. At this point, participants in the Control condition were asked to complete 
the dependent measures (which will be described in the Results section), and were debriefed and 
allowed to leave.  
Participants in the experimental conditions were given additional information. Following the 
video, each participant in the experimental conditions was told that the current focus group members 
had viewed some anonymous questionnaires from the Introductory Psychology mass testing session, 
and that a sample of the participant’s questionnaires were among those viewed by the group. 
Supposedly, the group had been asked to provide feedback about what they thought of the people who 
filled out the questionnaires as part of the lab’s research on group dynamics. The participant was 
assured that the group did not know the identity of the people whose questionnaires they viewed, and 
was informed that the experimenter would show her the comments made by the current group 
members so that the participant would have an idea of what to expect if she joined the group. The 
experimenter gave the participant an envelope containing the feedback from the group and excused 
herself from the room so that the participant could read the feedback privately. This feedback 
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constituted the experimental manipulation and will be described shortly. When the experimenter 
returned to the room, she told the participant that the information part of the session was over, and 
asked the participant to complete a questionnaire that contained the dependent measures, which will 
be described in the Results section. After this, participants were thoroughly debriefed and allowed to 
leave.  
 Participants were randomly assigned to condition--No feedback, CQ feedback, or SC 
feedback--with the provision that the cells were filled evenly as the experiment progressed, and that 
half of the participants in each condition were HSEs and half were LSEs.  
Experimental Conditions 
 
Each supposedly hand-written comment from the group members was in response to the 
typed question, “Based on what you have read, what impression have you formed of this person?” 
The feedback was on four separate sheets of paper, one for each comment, which looked as though it 
had been photocopied from a larger questionnaire.  
Participants in the SC-feedback condition received the following comments: 
“She seems sociable from the responses she provided to some of the items.” 
“I get the impression that she's fun… an outgoing person.” 
“I bet she has an exciting personality.” 
“She seems like a popular person.” 
Participants in the CQ-feedback condition received the following comments: 
“She seems understanding and kind from the responses she provided to some of the 
items.” 
“I get the impression that she's honest... a trustworthy person.” 
“I bet she is accepting of others.” 
“She seems like a supportive friend.” 




During the debriefing, four participants (one HSE in the "No feedback" condition, two HSEs 
in the "CQ Feedback" condition, and one LSE in the "CQ Feedback" condition) revealed that they 
either doubted that the group was real or doubted the feedback. Analyses were conducted with and 
without these participants, and their inclusion did not change the results. Therefore, their data were 
included in the analyses. However, one LSE in the SC condition was excluded because her responses 
to the dependent measures were more than three standard deviations below the mean, and one HSE 
woman in the SC condition was excluded because she responded in a way that raised doubts about her 
truthfulness (alternating highest and lowest options) on her questionnaires. 
All dependent measures were administered in a single questionnaire and asked participants to 
respond on nine-point scales, on which low numbers represented disagreement or rejection of the 
statement and high numbers represented agreement or acceptance of the statement.  
Willingness to join the group. I hypothesized that the domain of feedback would affect LSEs', 
but not HSEs’, social decision-making. My primary dependent measure was the strength of the 
participant’s willingness to join the group (“How much would you like to join this focus group?,” 
“How many meetings would you like to attend?,” and “How willing are you to attend meetings held 
late in the evenings, and on Saturday and Sunday mornings at 8:00 am?”). These items were averaged 
to form a willingness to join index (α = .89). 
A 2 x 3 (Self-Esteem Group x Feedback Condition) ANOVA revealed no main effects of 
self-esteem or feedback condition, ps > .30. Instead, the predicted interaction emerged, F(2, 50) 3.23, 
p < .048, η2 = .11, and is graphed in Figure 7. Simple-effects analyses indicated that for HSEs, 
feedback had no effect on their willingness to join the group, F(2, 50) < 1.0, but it did have an effect 
on LSEs' willingness to join the group, F(2, 50) = 3.99, p < .025. LSEs were equally moderate in their 
willingness to join the group in both the No-feedback and CQ-feedback conditions (Ms = 6.14 and 
6.25, respectively; SDs = 1.49 and 1.52, respectively), F(2, 50) < 1. In contrast, LSEs were much 
more willing to join the group after receiving SC feedback (M = 7.81, SD = 1.19) than either LSEs in 
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the No-feedback condition, F(1, 50) = 6.94, p < .011, or CQ-feedback condition, F(1, 50) = 4.99, p < 
.029. Further comparisons confirmed that none of the HSE groups differed statistically from one 






Perceptions of acceptance. I hypothesized that participants would anticipate greater 
acceptance from SC feedback than from CQ feedback, but that this difference in anticipated 
acceptance would be greater for LSEs than HSEs, due to LSEs' greater attunement to acceptance 
cues. To test this prediction, I asked participants: “Do you think that the group expects that they will 






























Figure 7. Effect of No feedback, CQ feedback, or SC feedback on participants’ 




they get to know you?,” “How much does the group as a whole like you now?,” “How much will the 
group as a whole like you after meeting you four times?,” “Do you think that the group has an 
accurate impression of you?,” and “Does the group recognize the qualities that you have?.” These six 
items were averaged to form a perceived acceptance index (α = .83). 
A 2 x 3 (Self-Esteem Group x Feedback Condition) ANOVA on this index yielded a main 
effect of self-esteem, with HSEs expecting more acceptance overall than LSEs (M = 7.32 and M = 
6.58; SDs = 0.73 and 1.24, respectively), F(1, 50) = 7.06, p < .010, η2 = .12, as well as a main effect 
of condition, F(2, 50) = 8.65, p < .001, η2 = .26. Simple-effects analyses indicated that in the No-
feedback condition (M = 6.26, SD = 1.24), participants anticipated less acceptance than participants in 
either the CQ-feedback condition (M = 7.05. SD = 0.85), F(1, 50) = 7.37, p < .009, or SC-feedback 
condition (M = 7.60, SD = 0.62), F(1, 50) = 19.98, p < .001. Additionally, the SC feedback was seen 
as more predictive of acceptance than the CQ feedback, F(1, 50) = 4.15, p < .046. Further simple-
effects analyses testing my a priori hypothesis that LSEs would differentiate more than HSEs between 
SC and CQ feedback confirmed that LSEs anticipated much greater acceptance following SC 
feedback than CQ feedback (Ms = 7.49 and 6.58, respectively; SDs = 0.64 and 0.75, respectively), 
F(1, 50) = 4.32, p < .042, but  HSE did not differentiate between SC and CQ feedback (Ms = 7.73 and 
7.40, respectively, SDs = 0.60 and 0.76, respectively), F(1, 50) < 1.  
A case of moderated mediation. I predicted that SC feedback would be more appealing to 
LSEs than CQ feedback because SCs are more associated with acceptance from strangers than CQs. 
For LSEs, believing that the group thinks they possess SCs will increase their anticipated acceptance 
from the group and therefore increase their willingness to join the group. In contrast, because HSEs 
are not attuned to small differences in the possibility of acceptance, I hypothesized that they would 
not prefer SC feedback to CQ feedback.  
As the previous analyses indicated, HSEs were equally interested in joining the group 
following SC and CQ feedback, whereas LSEs strongly preferred to join the group following SC 
feedback. Additionally, SC feedback was related to greater anticipated acceptance from the group for 
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LSEs, but not for HSEs. I used regression to examine the association between anticipated acceptance 
from the group and participants’ willingness to join the group. Self-esteem was dummy coded (LSEs 
= 0, HSEs = 1), anticipated acceptance mean-centered, and their product was used as the interaction 
term. As predicted, self-esteem moderated the association between perceived acceptance from the 
group and participants’ willingness to join the group, ß = -.33, t(55) = 1.79, p < .039. Simple-effects 
analyses indicated that LSEs’ willingness to join the group was strongly related to their perceptions of 
acceptance, ß = .64, t(55) = 5.45, p < .001, but HSEs’ willingness was unrelated to their perceptions 
of acceptance, ß = .02, t(55) = .08. Given that self-esteem moderated the associations between the 
predictor, mediator, and dependent variables, I tested my mediation hypothesis for LSEs separately 
from HSEs.12 
To test for mediation among the LSE participants, a series of regressions was conducted, the 
results of which are depicted in Figure 8. The first analysis indicated that the group that provided SC 
feedback was strongly preferred over the group that provided CQ feedback, ß = .52, t(55) = 2.27, p < 
.014. The second regression analysis showed that SC feedback was also more strongly associated 
with acceptance from the group than was CQ feedback, ß =.57, t(55) = 2.52, p < .007. For the final 
regression analysis, I entered both feedback and perceptions of acceptance simultaneously to predict 
LSEs' willingness to join the group. When both predictors were included in the regression equation, 
acceptance predicted participants’ willingness to join the group, ß = .51, t(55) = 1.78, p < .040, but 
feedback did not, ß = .23, t(55) = 0.81. Sobel’s test confirmed that perceived acceptance mediated the 
effect of CQ versus SC feedback on LSEs' decision-making, z = 2.23, p < .024.This analysis is  
                                                
12     Because the CQ-feedback condition and the control condition do not differ in their effect on participants’ 
willingness to join the group, it could be argued that I could combine data from these conditions to compare to 
the SC condition in these analyses. However, the CQ and Control conditions differ in their association with the 
mediator, in that CQ feedback conveys greater acceptance than does No feedback. Therefore, I chose to 
compare the relative effects of SC and CQ feedback in these analyses, which better represents my hypothesis. 
However, as I would do in simple-effects analyses, I used the error terms from the whole sample in these 
analyses.   
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consistent with my interpretation that LSEs prefer to join the group that gave them SC feedback 
because they associate SCs with acceptance from the group. 
For HSEs, I conducted similar analyses for comparison purposes. As reported earlier, the 
feedback had no effect on HSEs’ willingness to join the group, ß = -.17, t < 1. The effect of feedback 
on anticipated acceptance was also not significant, ß =.24, t < 1. Finally, perceptions of acceptance 
(controlling for feedback condition) were not significantly associated with HSEs’ willingness to join 
the group, ß =.06, t(55) = 0.17. Is it possible that this lack of association for HSEs is due to restricted 
variance in their willingness to join the group? No. HSEs showed as much variation on this variable 







In reflection of their social-acceptance schema, these results illustrate that LSE women are 
much more drawn to SC than CQ feedback. Being told by the group that they are “socially skilled, 
popular and outgoing” is interpreted as “I will definitely accept you,” whereas being told they are 
“accepting, supportive, and honest” leaves room for doubts. In contrast to what LSEs usually expect, 
the SC feedback acts as an insurance policy against risk, making them feel much safer to enter the 
ß = .57, p = .01 
Willingness 
to join group 
ß = .51, p = .04 Anticipated 
acceptance 
from group 
CQ vs. SC 
feedback 
(ß = .52, p = .01) ß = .23, p =.22  
Figure 8. Path coefficients for the mediation model that tested whether anticipated acceptance 
from the group mediated the effect of domain of feedback on LSEs’ willingness to join the 




situation. These results offer a nice demonstration of the sociometer proposition that LSEs have a 
strong desire for acceptance (Leary & Baumeister, 2000), but suggest that this desire is often masked 
by concerns about the possibility of rejection (Murray et al., 2006). 
For HSEs, feedback from the group is inconsequential. HSEs are less responsive to 
acceptance and therefore do not differentiate CQ feedback from SC feedback. Nor do HSEs base their 
social decision-making on acceptance from others, because their internal resources inoculate them 
against the impact of potential rejection.  
Once again, these findings illustrate the greater attunement of self-esteem to SCs than CQs. 
HSEs’ explicit self-ratings, cognitive trait-accessibility, and social decision-making do not strongly 
differentiate SC from CQs. In contrast, LSEs’ self-ratings, cognitive accessibility, and social decision 
making are highly attuned to SCs, but less so to CQs. I posit that the same social value-system 
underlies all of these findings. LSEs’ feelings of devaluation cause them to doubt their possession of 
SCs precisely because others value the possession of SCs. In contrast, HSEs’ confidence in their 
relational value means that they do not differentiate between CQs and SCs because they have a less 
pressing need to understand their social value.  
Perhaps LSEs thought that the CQ feedback was less accurate than the SC feedback. In both 
feedback conditions, participants thought that the group had an extremely accurate impression of 
them, and recognized the qualities that they had (both Ms = 7.81). Neither the content of the feedback 
or participants’ self-esteem moderated this assessment, all Fs < 1. Therefore, it is not the case that 
LSEs simply did not believe the CQ feedback. The more likely possibility is that LSEs perceived that 
CQ feedback was accurate, but of little import because it did not predict liking by the group. Just as 
when a single person is told that a potential blind date has a “great personality,” I suspect that CQ 




The Sociometer is Attuned to “Superficial” SCs 
 
 People's personal theories contend that their self-esteem is more contingent on virtue than 
appearances (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001) and that CQs are more important and emotionally salient than 
SCs, yet evidence from the present Studies 1 and 5 suggests that social acceptance is more dependent 
on the possession of SCs than CQs. The diverse studies in this dissertation support my sociometer 
account of the attunement of self-esteem to trait domains, at least when comparing the socially 
important domains of SCs and CQs. Not only is self-esteem more correlated with SCs than CQs, but 
self-esteem relates to the cognitive accessibility of SCs but not CQs, LSEs’ SC self-views, but not CQ 
self-views, are responsive to discrepant social cues about the self, and LSEs' social behavior is 
affected by SC feedback but not CQ feedback.  
Social Roles Reveal the Sociometer’s “Hidden Depths” 
  
Although CQs are generally less related to self-esteem than SCs, they are not irrelevant to the 
sociometer. The extended period of interaction required to accurately assess CQs relative to SCs 
makes them more meaningful indicators of relational value in intimate contexts. CQs are related to 
interdependence: They are communal traits primarily aimed at satisfying the needs of one’s relational 
partner. In reflection of this, the sociometers of people in romantic relationships are more attuned to 
their CQs than are the sociometers of people who are single. Also, women and people of East Asian 
descent have sociometers that are more reponsive to CQs than men or people of Western descent. The 
results of these studies support my sociometer account of the relation between self-esteem and the 
self-concept. For the social roles that emphasize the importance of CQs for social acceptance, I find 
that people’s feelings of self-worth are attuned to their beliefs about their kindness, supportiveness, 
and honesty. 
The Social Value of Traits Affects Social Behavior 
  
The greater attunement of self-esteem to SCs than CQs is not only an “in-the head” 
phenomenon. Study 5 suggested that SC feedback, but not CQ feedback, caused LSEs to abandon a 
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self-protective social orientation and eagerly risk joining a group. Applying Schlenker and Leary’s 
(1982) model of social anxiety to my results, I suggest that LSEs’ usual social inhibitions are a 
consequence of their desire to create the impression that they are socially valuable (i.e., someone high 
in SCs), combined with their doubts that they can create that impression. By providing LSEs with SC 
feedback, I increased their confidence that they could create their desired impression, which 
alleviated anxiety and allowed them to seek the acceptance they desire. This evidence is perhaps the 
strongest indication of the importance of SCs for social life that I have presented in this dissertation. 
LSEs are exceedingly rigorous in their attention to cues of potential acceptance or rejection (Leary & 
Baumeister, 2000), and require concrete, unambiguous assurances that they will be accepted before 
they will abandon a self-protective social orientation (Anthony et al., 2007). Therefore, for LSEs to 
interpret the SC feedback as a strong and clear predictor of acceptance, and to use this information to 
make a risky social decision, speaks volumes about the social value of SCs and the strength of their 
association with anticipated acceptance from others.  
Questions That Remain 
Are These Results Specific to University Students?  
The social context of a university student may emphasize the importance of SCs. Many of my 
participants recently moved to a new city and were looking for new friends and a romantic partner. 
New students frequently find themselves in initiation situations (e.g., orientation events, bars), all of 
which should serve to highlight SCs. One could argue that as Westerners get older and more settled, 
their self-esteem no longer focuses on the “superficial” SCs. I tested this possibility by assessing the 
self-esteem and SASI self-ratings of a sample of adults (N = 50, 76% female, M age = 48.52) who 
were the parents of participants in Study 2. The results mirrored those obtained for the university 
samples: For these middle-aged adults, SCs related to self-esteem more strongly than did CQs, r = 
.38, p < .007, and r = .12, ns, respectively.   
 
 47 
Are Evolutionary Models of Social Value Compatible with These Results? 
Evolutionary models have long argued that certain traits are inherently valuable because of 
their influence on one’s ability to successfully bear or support offspring. For example, physical 
attractiveness may be a marker of genetic fitness and resistance to disease, making attractive people 
valuable mates, whereas social status affords one’s mates and interaction partners social benefits that 
could not otherwise be obtained (e.g., Buss & Barnes, 1986; Thornhill & Grammer, 1999). Although 
evolutionary models have recently begun to include predictions about the value of CQs (e.g., Fletcher 
et al., 1999), the vast majority of evolutionary research on social value focuses on SCs. For example, 
social exchange and mate selection research indicates that SCs are widely valued in a potential 
romantic partner, across many diverse cultures (Buss et al., 1990;Buss & Barnes, 1986). It could be 
argued that social context should not predict the importance of SCs. Instead, these traits should be 
universally valued because of their strong association with evolutionary fitness, and so self-esteem 
should be universally attuned to SCs. Testing this possibility was not the specific focus of my 
dissertation, but my results are consistent with this interpretation. Across my studies, the association 
between self-esteem and SCs was relatively strong and invariant. However, because my research was 
conducted in an independent cultural context, my studies do not rule out the possibility that there may 
be other social contexts (e.g., a rural Chinese village) where social value is not based on SCs and thus 
self-esteem is not attuned to those traits.  
Can Trait Ambiguity and the Better-Than-Average Effect Explain These Results? 
  
People have a tendency to rate themselves higher than average on positive traits, and this 
tendency is increased when the trait is perceived to be relatively controllable and ambiguous (Alicke 
& Govorun, 2005). Presumably, this self-enhancement occurs because it is easier to claim 
responsibility for traits that are within one’s control (and conversely, difficult to claim responsibility 
for traits that are deemed uncontrollable; Alicke, 1985), and because it is easier to claim to possess 
traits that have a wider range of possible behavioral exemplars (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 
1989). Undoubtedly, these characteristics of controllability and ambiguity differentiate SCs from CQs 
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(Anthony et al., 2007), which suggests that people should rate themselves higher in CQs than SCs, 
and this is the case (e.g., Study 2, Ms = 77.84 and 66.72, respectively; F(1, 319) = 369.87, p < .001).  
  Can these differences in controllability and ambiguity account for my finding that LSEs rate 
themselves lower than HSEs in SCs, but not CQs? I believe that the ambiguity and controllability of 
CQs help explain why LSEs feel safe to claim CQs. These features of CQs make it both easier to 
protect against failure in that domain (e.g., “I’ll try harder to be more kind next time”) and easier to 
reject negative feedback (e.g., “She must have a strange definition of loyalty”), both of which may 
help people maintain positive self-views in this domain. However, ambiguity and controllability 
cannot explain parsimoniously why LSEs rate themselves lower than HSEs on SCs. In my view, the 
data that I have presented suggest that LSEs have trouble cognitively accessing their strengths (and 
greater ease accessing their weaknesses) in the SC domain because these traits are related to 
acceptance from others, and their low sociometers tell them that they apparently lack what it takes to 
gain acceptance.  
Can a Bottom-up Account Explain These Results? 
  
Although I examined the attunement of self-esteem to traits by proposing that chronic self-
esteem predicts one’s specific self-evaluations about socially valuable traits, an alternative 
explanation for my results is that low self-esteem is a consequence of low standing on valuable traits 
that are difficult to change. Such a bottom-up account states that LSEs have low self-esteem because 
they actually lack SCs. In contrast, CQs are unrelated to self-esteem because they are ambiguous, 
easily-modified traits and hence, low-standing on CQs is less damaging to self-worth. However, 
research suggests that the differing self-views expressed by HSEs and LSEs are not representative of 
objective differences in their possession of SCs. Self-esteem does not generally predict actual 
popularity or social skills (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003), nor is it associated with 
observer-rated physical attractiveness (Feingold, 1992). These results illustrate the fact that people’s 
self-knowledge--both global (e.g., self-esteem) and specific (e.g., self-conceptions)--is biased and 
out-of-touch with reality (e.g., Tice & Wallace, 2003). Therefore, the only plausible bottom-up 
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interpretation of my results is that low self-esteem results from the belief that one lacks SCs. But if 
self-esteem is not related to actual differences in the possession of SCs, where do LSEs’ and HSEs’ 
differing beliefs come from?  
One possibility is that self-esteem does not predict the actual SCs of university age people, 
but it did predict SCs at some point: LSEs were “ugly ducklings,” and their self-concepts have not 
caught up with their new physical and social standing. Although some evidence suggests that self-
views are indeed more accurate (i.e., similar to peers’ and teachers’ ratings) prior to age 12 than they 
are in later life (Kenny, 1994), the objective SCs of children are largely unrelated to self-esteem 
(Baumeister et al., 2003). In contrast to this bottom-up line of thinking, I adopt a top-down account of 
the association between self-esteem and self-concept. Top-down accounts suggest that the prism of 
global self-worth distorts the self-concept, such that feeling worthy causes people to believe they 
possess traits, whereas feeling less worthy causes people to doubt their possession of positive 
qualities (see Brown, Dutton, & Cook, 2001). However, as I will discuss shortly, I believe that self-
esteem does not distort all self-views equally.  
Can Contingency Theory Explain These Results? 
 
 LSEs are more likely than HSEs to report that their self-esteem is contingent on external, less 
controllable domains such as appearance (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). One implication of this finding is 
that basing one's self-worth on external domains that are out of one's control makes it more difficult 
to satisfy one's contingencies, resulting in lower and more tenuous self-esteem. It is possible that 
because LSEs are more contingent than HSEs on SCs such as appearance, they are more attentive to 
"failures" in that domain (e.g., an unfavourable social comparison or an unkind remark) and hence 
have lower SC self-ratings than HSEs. Also, LSEs' contingency on SCs may cause them to be 
especially elated when given positive SC feedback, which in turn may cause them to be more 
interested in joining the group that provided such feedback. But this interpretation leaves unanswered 
the question of where contingency on SCs came from in the first place. My model specifically 
addresses this question by positing that acceptance grants SCs their interpersonal power and hence 
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causes self-esteem to be more contingent on SCs than CQs. By positing acceptance as the pivotal 
determinant of self-esteem contingencies within social roles, I am offering a very social-
psychological interpretation of self-esteem contingency theory. Moreover, because people’s personal 
theories about the importance and salience of CQs over SCs contradicts the actual attunement of self-
esteem to SCs over CQs, my results are consistent with previous research suggesting that people are 
not always aware of the extent to which their self-esteem is contingent on what other people value 
(e.g., Leary et al., 2003).  
Implications of These Results  
The Nature of LSEs’ Self-Doubts  
To my knowledge, the results of this dissertation are the first to show that self-esteem is not 
evenly associated with all self-concept domains. LSEs are not more likely than HSEs to think they are 
relatively weak on all traits; on CQs, LSEs hold self-views that are very positive, nearly as positive as 
those of HSEs. This finding probably was not obtained previously because, before the SASI, 
measures of self-concept and of domain-specific self-esteem neglected to measure CQs (e.g., Fleming 
& Courtney, 1984; Helmreich & Stapp, 1974; Marsh, Smith, & Barnes, 1983; Pelham & Swann, 
1989). 
The finding that self-esteem is strongly related to the self-concept only for SCs calls for a 
modification in the top-down account of self-esteem, best articulated by Brown (e.g., Brown et al., 
2001). Brown’s top-down model proposed that global self-esteem influences the content of the self-
concept universally: HSEs’ strong feelings of self-worth cause them to believe that they possess many 
desirable qualities, whereas LSEs’ doubts about their worth cause them to believe that they lack 
desirable qualities. My results suggest that the prism of global self-worth does not distort all aspects 
of the self-concept equally. Instead, I have tried to integrate the top-down view with sociometer 
theory, leading me to predict that actual social value determines the specific aspects of the self-
concept that become the focus of the distorting prism of self-esteem. That prism focuses on traits that 
are related to social acceptance, and hence, focuses on SCs more than CQs (for Westerners at least).  
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Extending Sociometer Theory 
In this dissertation, I have extended sociometer theory in three main ways. The first is 
methodological: I have shown the value of examining sociometer predictions not only in self-ratings, 
but in the cognitive accessibility of strengths and weaknesses and in social-decision-making. Second, 
I examined the consequences of chronic high- or low-self-esteem for people’s self-beliefs and social 
motivations, an aspect of sociometer theory that previously had received little empirical attention. 
Third, I have offered a very social-psychological account of what influences the sociometer, and in 
turn, the self-concept. Regardless of the original determinants of one’s self-concept or self-esteem, 
their interconnection is maintained by the social roles that one occupies and the daily task of 
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